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Abstract. The global spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in poultry, wild birds and humans, poses a sig-
nificant pandemic threat and a serious public health risk. An efficient surveillance and disease control system relies on
the understanding of the dispersion patterns and spreading mechanisms of the virus. A space-time cluster analysis of
H5N1 outbreaks was used to identify spatio-temporal patterns at a global scale and over an extended period of time.
Potential mechanisms explaining the spread of the H5N1 virus, and the role of wild birds, were analyzed. Between
December 2003 and December 2006, three global epidemic phases of H5N1 influenza were identified. These H5N1
outbreaks showed a clear seasonal pattern, with a high density of outbreaks in winter and early spring (i.e., October
to March). In phase I and II only the East Asia Australian flyway was affected. During phase III, the H5N1 viruses
started to appear in four other flyways: the Central Asian flyway, the Black Sea Mediterranean flyway, the East Atlantic
flyway and the East Africa West Asian flyway. Six disease cluster patterns along these flyways were found to be asso-
ciated with the seasonal migration of wild birds. The spread of the H5N1 virus, as demonstrated by the space-time clus-
ters, was associated with the patterns of migration of wild birds. Wild birds may therefore play an important role in
the spread of H5N1 over long distances. Disease clusters were also detected at sites where wild birds are known to
overwinter and at times when migratory birds were present. This leads to the suggestion that wild birds may also be
involved in spreading the H5N1 virus over short distances.
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Introduction
The highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1
virus is a highly pathogenic strain of the influenza A
virus, which can cause systemic disease, resulting in
high mortality in bird populations (Swayne and
Halvorson 2003; Swayne and King 2003), and
which can also infect humans and many other ani-
mal species (Cardona et al., 2009). The virus was
detected for the first time in farmed geese in south-
ern China in 1996 (Xu et al., 1999). The first case
of a human becoming infected with the H5N1 virus
was documented in Hong Kong in 1997 (Subbarao
and Katz, 2000). The present outbreak of H5N1
began in December 2003, when South Korea identi-
fied the virus in poultry populations (Lee et al.,
2005). The virus circulated in east and southeast
Asia during 2003 and 2004. In May 2005, the first
H5N1 outbreak in migratory waterfowl was detect-
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ed at the Qinghai Lake in western China (Chen et
al., 2005, 2006; Liu et al., 2005). In July 2005, the
virus was detected in Russia, and it arrived in
Romania in October 2005 (Gilbert et al., 2006b).
Africa reported its first emergence of H5N1 in
Nigeria in February 2006 (Ducatez et al., 2006).
This global H5N1 epidemic continues to date and
has raised many questions. It is important to find
out what the dispersion patterns of the virus are.
Subsequently, which mechanisms are responsible for
the observed patterns, and more specifically, do
migratory birds play a role in the global H5N1
transmission?
A number of studies have been undertaken to
answer these questions. The worldwide avian
influenza activity has been summarized (Alexander,
2007; Yee et al., 2009). Descriptive methods have
been used to analyse the spread of H5N1 outbreaks
(Tiensin et al., 2005; Gilbert et al., 2006b).
Phylogenetic analyses of the lineage relationship
were executed on the virus strains isolated in eastern
Asia (Li et al., 2004), South Korea (Lee et al., 2008),
Nigeria (Ducatez et al., 2006) and western Africa
(Ducatez et al., 2007). Local level space-time cluster
analyses of H5N1 outbreaks over short time periods
have been carried out in China (Oyana et al., 2006),
Vietnam (Pfeiffer et al., 2007) and Romania (Ward
et al., 2008). The purpose of these studies was to
identify spatio-temporal patterns of the spread of
the disease and to ascertain possible underlying
mechanisms. A study, covering an extended period
of time on a global scale, has not been undertaken
to date, though this is important if knowledge is to
be gained on the worldwide spread of the H5N1
virus. Previous studies (Kilpatrick et al., 2006;
Gilbert et al., 2008) suggested that the movements
of wild birds and domestic poultry were the sus-
pected agents for spreading the virus. Poultry trans-
portation and the wild bird trade were also suspect-
ed agents. Their role in spreading the H5N1 virus is
relatively easy to track and detect, by analysing
trade data (Kilpatrick et al., 2006). However, to
what extent migratory waterbirds can be regarded
as the cause of the virus spread is still under investi-
gation (Feare and Yasué, 2006; Normile, 2006).
Some studies have questioned the role of wild
birds in spreading the H5N1 virus. Weber and
Stilianakis (2007) indicated that it is implausible for
an infected bird to migrate over long distances, as
migration leads to immunosuppression and is nega-
tively affected by virus infection. Feare and Yasué
(2006) questioned an experiment of asymptomatic
infection of wild birds with H5N1, due to chal-
lenges of sample species identification and capture
methods. Also, even though large numbers of birds
migrate through the East Atlantic flyway and East
Asian Australian flyway, the disease currently only
circulates in Eurasia and Africa, without further
spread to America and Australia. This suggests that
migratory birds may not be responsible for the long-
distance spread of the H5N1 virus.
A number of studies, however, do suggest wild
birds may spread the H5N1 virus. Chen et al.
(2004) indicated that ducks can carry the H5N1
virus asymptomatically. Gilbert et al. (2006b)
detected that the directions in which the disease
spread, were consistent with the major bird migra-
tion routes in the western Palaearctic. Brown et al.
(2008) observed that swans and geese can shed
H5N1 virus before and after the onset of clinical
signs, on the basis of an experimental infection of
H5N1 virus. Keawcharoen et al. (2008) found that
some wild duck species showed abundant virus
excretion without clinical or pathologic evidence of
debilitating disease, and therefore could potentially
be long-distance vectors of H5N1.
If H5N1 is spread by wild birds, either over long
or over short distances, this might be deduced from
spatial-temporal patterns of the disease outbreaks
(Onozuka and Hagihara, 2008; Ward et al., 2008).
Wild birds utilize large number of over-staging sites
along the flyways to forage during the migration,
and settle in breeding and wintering sites during the
non-migration seasons. This behaviour determines a
potential role of wild birds in H5N1 spread over
long and short distances, which requires both
regional and local disease patterns to be generated.
Due to intercontinental bird migration and the
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international trade of fowl, the role of wild birds as
disease vectors should be viewed on a global scale
(Kilpatrick et al., 2006). This study was designed to
throw light on the role of wild birds in spreading
H5N1 viruses. The objectives of this study were to
identify the spatio-temporal patterns and dynamics
of H5N1 outbreaks on a global scale, and to further
deduce the role of wild birds in the worldwide
transmission of H5N1 over long and short dis-
tances.
Materials and methods
The main reservoirs of avian influenza are consid-
ered to be waterbirds, such as duck, geese, swan,
gulls, terns and shorebirds (Webster et al., 1992;
Alexander, 2000; Suarez, 2000; Olsen et al., 2006).
Therefore, the possible role of migratory birds in
spreading the H5N1 virus was examined by com-
paring the spatio-temporal dynamics of the disease
clusters with the timing, location and direction of
the major waterbird migration flyways. A flyway is
the entire range a migratory bird species (or groups
of related species or distinct populations of a single
species), uses when moving on an annual basis from
their breeding grounds to non-breeding areas and
back, including intermediate resting and feeding
places (Boere and Stroud, 2006). Figure 1 depicts
the eight broadly grouped flyways of waterbirds,
adapted from information collected and analyzed by
the International Wader Study Group (Asia-Pacific
Migratory Waterbird Conservation Committee,
2001; Stroud et al., 2004). In each flyway, the spring
migration passes in a northward direction and the
autumn migration passes in a southward direction.
The migratory direction is defined based on the
eight waterbird flyways, omitting the complexity of
the migration strategies and systems of individual
waterbird species (Boere and Stroud, 2006). Such
attempts to simplify the main migration routes may
lose information, for example, an important com-
ponent of east-west migration in Eurasia is exclud-
Fig. 1. Eight broad flyways of migratory waterbirds (source: International Wader Study Group).
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ed in the above flyways (Scott and Rose, 1996;
Boere and Stroud, 2006). These limitations are con-
sidered when interpreting the results. On the other
hand, strong relationships between the spread of
avian influenza and the major bird migratory routes
would suggest a role.
Data
The time-location series of H5N1 outbreaks were
extracted from official reports provided by the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)
(http://www.oie.int). Each report contained the fol-
lowing attributes: province, district, sub-district,
type of epidemiological unit, location, latitude, lon-
gitude, start time, end time, affected species, as well
as the number of susceptible cases, deaths, destroyed
and slaughtered animals. However, from December
2003 to December 2005, most Southeast Asian
reports (mainly in Thailand and Vietnam) lacked lat-
itude and longitude. In this study, the locations of
these outbreaks were geocoded on the basis of the
information provided in the reports, using the centre
of the specific administrative region involved. The
average area of the largest administrative division
(province) in Thailand and Vietnam is 6,716 km2,
equal to an area with a radius of approximately 46
km. Hence, some of the clusters detected (radius
<46 km) in Southeast Asia during this stage, may
suffer from a bias in geocoding, as the original loca-
tion of the outbreaks may have been located some-
where else (maximum 46 km error) than the cen-
troid of the administration division.
Three years of H5N1 outbreak data were used,
from December 2003 to December 2006. Both
Australian and American continents were omitted
from the map because of no report of highly patho-
genic avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks to date (Pei
et al., 2009; Yee et al., 2009). Figure 2a shows the
locations of the outbreaks. The outbreaks were all
concentrated in south and southeast Asia during
2003 and 2004. In 2005, outbreaks continued to be
reported in Asia, but also started to occur in west-
ern Russia and Europe. In 2006, the disease became
pandemic around the Black Sea region, the
Mediterranean region, western Europe and eastern
Africa. Figure 2b shows the locations of two differ-
ent types of outbreaks (i.e., in wild birds and in
poultry). Wild bird outbreaks were concentrated in
western Europe, with sporadic outbreaks being
observed in southern Europe and central Asia.
Poultry outbreaks, however, were concentrated in
southeast Asia (together with wild bird outbreaks
and a few mixed outbreaks), western Russia, the
Black Sea region, Arabia and Africa. As Figure 2 is
displayed for visualization, some specific outbreaks
could be invisible because of overlap with other out-
breaks, such as the wild bird H5N1 outbreak occur-
rence in Egypt in February 2006.
Epidemic curves
To display the outbreaks’ magnitude and trend
over time, epidemic curves were constructed by
counting weekly numbers of outbreaks from 2003
to 2006 in Asia, Europe and Africa. Because the
incubation period (i.e., the length of time between
exposure and onset of symptoms) for avian influen-
za is about 21 days (OIE, 2005), the time unit on the
x-axis was defined as 7 days, equalling one-third of
the incubation period (CDC, 2008). The incubation
period can be shorter, depending on the species and
exposure conditions (WHO, 2006).
Space-time permutation model
The space-time permutation model in scan statis-
tics has been used to test for spatio-temporal clus-
ters, and to identify their approximate location and
timing (Kulldorff et al., 2005). Space-time clusters
occur when an excess number of H5N1 outbreaks
are observed, within a user defined spatial and tem-
poral range. Disease spread is strongly influenced by
the spatial and temporal behaviour of the popula-
tion at risk. The H5N1 outbreaks are of concern to
multiple populations (i.e., poultry, wild bird and
human), which do not always have a clearly defined
distribution, like wild birds. The advantage of the
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space-time permutation model is, that it only
requires actual H5N1 outbreak data (Kulldorff et
al., 2005). The space-time permutation model does
require the population at risk to be constant, so
short analysis periods were selected in order to
respect this requirement (Kulldorff, 2006). The dis-
ease patterns of the different epidemic phases, were
therefore, analysed separately, using the space-time
permutation model and SaTScan software
(http://www.satscan.org). The populations involved
(i.e., the number of bird flocks, farms and villages)
could then be assumed to be constant for each epi-
demic phase.
The space-time permutation model analyzes clus-
ters of H5N1 outbreaks both spatially and temporal-
ly, by testing whether outbreaks that are close in
space are also close in time (Kulldorff, 2006). In the
permutation model, the scanning window forms a
cylinder with the base representing space and the
height representing time. The cylinder begins as a sin-
gle point, gradually increasing both in diameter and
in height, from zero to some maximum value, defined
by the user. The expected number of outbreaks was
calculated on the basis of the null hypothesis, assum-
ing complete spatial randomness, which is synony-
mous with assuming that the observed outbreaks
were approximately independent Poisson random
variables with a constant mean (Diggle, 2003). Based
on this approximation, a likelihood ratio was meas-
ured to determine whether the cylinder contained a
cluster or not. Of all the cylinders evaluated, the one
with the maximum likelihood is considered to be the
primary candidate for a true cluster (Kulldorff et al.,
2005). Statistical significance of detected clusters was
evaluated using a Monte Carlo simulation (Dwass,
1957). The test P-value was estimated by comparing
the rank of the maximum likelihood from the real
data set, with the maximum likelihood from the ran-
dom data sets, defined as P = rank / (1+number of
simulations) (Dwass, 1957; Kulldorff, 2006). A
detailed description and application of space-time
permutation scan statistics can be found in other pub-
lications (Kulldorff et al., 2005; Pearl et al., 2006;
Cooper et al., 2008).
Fig. 2. Worldwide distribution of H5N1 outbreaks from December 2003 to December 2006, displayed by year (a) and by type
of population (poultry or wild birds) (b).
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Input parameters
The maximum spatial scanning window should
not exceed 50% of all outbreaks, because otherwise
an extremely low outbreak rate outside the scan-
ning window may not be detected by the algorithm
(Kulldorff, 2006). Two maximum spatial scanning
windows were chosen for this analysis. One for
detecting local clusters, with a 10 km radius, simi-
lar to the surveillance area adopted in the European
Union (Pittman and Laddomada, 2008) and Asian
(Buranathai et al., 2007) surveillance procedures
(i.e., using a 10 km radius zone around infected
premises or flocks). Secondly, a window was chosen
with a radius equivalent to an area covering 10%
of all outbreaks for detecting regional clusters
(Norstrom et al., 2000). Even though poultry
movement was supposedly strictly controlled to
remain within the surveillance areas, the virus
could have been transmitted outside the surveil-
lance zones by wild birds. Given the size and shape
of the study area, the maximum spatial window
covering 10% of total outbreaks was selected to
avoid scanning outside the study area (Sauders et
al., 2003).
The temporal window was also set to be less than
50% of the study period (Kulldorff, 2006). The
maximum temporal scanning window was deter-
mined by a temporal risk window, which is defined
as the period that an infected cluster remains infec-
tious and the virus could be spread to other clusters.
In this study, the maximum temporal scanning win-
dow (temporal risk window) was assumed to be 30
days, starting one day after a initially defined first
lesion date and ending 21 days (the incubation peri-
od) after a slaughter and disinfection period
(assumed to be 9 days).
Other options in the SaTScan software were
selected as follows: (i) retrospective analysis was
selected to allow both “alive” and “historic” clus-
ters to be detected; (ii) scan for high rates was select-
ed for cluster detection; (iii) time aggregation was
not applied, as the maximum temporal scanning
window was set at 30 days and the disease did not
vary considerably over time; (iv) the number of
Monte Carlo simulations was set at 999; and (v) the
most likely clusters and non-overlapping secondary
clusters were selected. For mapping purposes, sig-
nificant clusters (P <0.05) were classified into five
risk levels, according to the relative risk obtained
from the analysis result.
Role of wild birds in H5N1 spread
To deduce the role of wild birds in H5N1 spread
over long distance, bird migration patterns were
compared with the disease trajectory. All regional
and local clusters indentified along flyways that
follow the migration routes were considered
potentially related to wild birds. To deduce the
role of wild birds in H5N1 spread over short dis-
tance, we examined whether the local clusters
were found at sites where wild birds are known to




Visual inspection of the epidemic curves (Fig. 3)
indicated three epidemic phases at the global level,
i.e. phase I extending from week 50 (2003) to week
15 (2004), phase II from week 21 (2004) to week 16
(2005), and phase III from week 23 (2005) to week
51 (2006). Asia was involved in all disease outbreak
phases, with peaks observed in week 4 (2004) dur-
ing phase I, in week 41 (2004) during phase II and
in week 46 (2005) during phase III. European and
African outbreaks were only reported in phase III.
The epidemic in Europe lasted from week 37 (2005)
to week 26 (2006), with three peaks in weeks 2, 8
and 20 (2006). The epidemic in Africa overlapped
with the European epidemic and lasted from week 2
to week 23 (2006), with a peak in week 12. All three
epidemic phases revealed a high occurrence of
H5N1 outbreaks in winter and early spring (i.e.,
from October to March).
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Dynamics of space-time H5N1 clusters and corre-
lated flyways
A total of 143 space-time clusters (P <0.05) were
identified by the space-time permutation scan statis-
tic, with 20, 20 and 74 local clusters, and another 8,
12 and 9 regional clusters forming for the three
phases, respectively. The temporal dynamics of the
identified space-time clusters in the three global epi-
demic phases were displayed in Figure 4, and over-
laid with the five correlated flyways. (i.e., the East
Asia Australian, the Central Asian, the Black Sea
Mediterranean, the East Atlantic and the East Africa
West Asian flyway).
Global H5N1 epidemic phase I
During the first stage of the disease outbreak, in
December 2003 (Fig. 4Ia), significant clusters were
identified in Indonesia, Korea and Vietnam, with
low risk of infection in Southeast Asia and high risk
in Korea. In January 2004 (Fig. 4Ib), the virus cir-
culated throughout Vietnam at both local and
regional level, forming six low risk clusters.
Meanwhile, another low risk regional cluster
occurred in southeast China. In February 2004 (Fig.
4Ic), one local cluster was identified in Indonesia,
followed by one regional cluster in Thailand. Then,
medium and high risk clusters started appearing in
Cambodia and Japan. In April 2004 (Fig. 4Id),
another high risk local cluster was identified in
Thailand. During this phase, only one major migrat-
ing bird flyway (the East Asia Australian flyway)
was affected.
Global H5N1 epidemic phase II
From March to May 2004 the H5N1 virus showed
little activity, but then low and medium risk clusters
started appearing in Thailand between June and
December 2004 (Fig. 4IIa-g). Medium risk clusters
were also identified in Malaysia in September (Fig.
4IId) and in Indonesia in December of that same year
(Fig. 4IIg). In January and February 2005 (Fig. 4IIh-
i), ten disease clusters were located in Vietnam, at
both local and regional level, with low and medium
risk factors. The disease reoccurred in Thailand in
February (Fig. 4IIi), and in Indonesia in February and
March 2005 (Fig. 4IIi-j), forming one and six clusters,
respectively. As during the first phase, the H5N1 virus
was limited to the East Asia Australian flyway.
Fig. 3. Epidemic curves of reported H5N1 outbreaks from
December 2003 to December 2006, displayed respectively for
Asia, Europe and Africa. The three epidemic phases are sepa-
rated by dashed lines.
Fig. 4. Monthly dynamics of significant space-time clusters (P <0.05) in each epidemic phase. The size of the circle is deter-
mined by the value of the relative risk (ratio of observed to expected outbreaks) and overlaid with the correlated flyways. Black
circles indicate local clusters (radius δ 10 km) and red circles indicate regional clusters (radius >10 km).
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Global H5N1 epidemic phase III
As in 2004, no H5N1 clusters were identified dur-
ing April, May or June 2005. In July and August
2005 (Fig. 4IIIa-b), eight clusters were located in
western Russia and Kazakhstan. In southeast Asia,
clusters were identified in Thailand between July
and September (Fig. 4IIIa-c), reappearing in south
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Indonesia during October (Fig. 4IIId). Eighteen clus-
ters were identified in Vietnam between October
and December 2005, forming either a low or a
medium risk, at both local and regional level (Fig.
4IIIe-f). In October 2005, another medium risk clus-
ter was located in western Russia (Fig. 4IIId).
Thereafter, some sporadic outbreaks were reported
in the Black Sea region, leading to four clusters (two
of them high risk) in Ukraine and two medium risk
clusters in Romania in December 2005 (Fig. 4IIIf).
Disease clusters were also identified in the eastern
Mediterranean in January 2006 (two of them low
risk and five medium risk clusters) and in Nigeria,
where three local clusters occurred in January and
February 2006 (Fig. 4IIIg-h).
In February 2006 (Fig. 4IIIh), more disease clus-
ters were located in the eastern Mediterranean
region, forming one high risk local cluster in Italy
and four low and medium risk clusters (at both
local and regional level) in Egypt. Within the same
month, two local clusters were identified in
Slovenia and France, with a high and low risk fac-
tor, respectively (Fig. 4IIIh). By March 2006 there
were outbreaks in northern Europe (Fig. 4IIIi),
with two local clusters (medium to high risk) and
one low risk regional cluster in Denmark. Another
six clusters (low to medium risk) appeared in
Egypt during March (Fig. 4IIIi). In April 2006 (Fig.
4IIIj), two medium risk local clusters were located
in Sudan, as well as one medium risk local cluster
in Pakistan. Meanwhile in Asia, one local cluster
was identified in Hong Kong in February 2006
(Fig. 4IIIh), and three clusters (at both local and
regional level) in Myanmar in March and April
(Fig. 4IIIi-j). The disease appeared in Romania
(five low to medium risk clusters) in May (Fig.
4IIIk), and in neighbouring Hungary (one medium
risk cluster) in June 2006 (Fig. 4IIIl). After a rela-
tively long period with low virus activity (July to
October 2006), one final high risk local cluster
was identified in Korea in November 2006 (Fig.
4IIIm).
During this third epidemic phase, the H5N1 virus
circulated chronologically, via the East Asia Atlantic
flyway to the Central Asian flyway, the Black Sea
Mediterranean flyway, the East Atlantic flyway and
finally the East Africa West Asian flyway.
Space-time H5N1 clusters along and across flyways
Based on the five identified flyways (Fig. 4), the
sum of clusters occurring per month within each fly-
way was plotted. A chronology emerges, indicating
the spread of disease clusters along and across fly-
ways, as shown in Figure 5.
Disease clusters appeared throughout the East Asia
Australian flyway during the whole study period,
with peaks in December 2003, February and
November 2005. In the Central Asian flyway, disease
clusters started emerging in July 2005 and waned in
October 2005. In the Black Sea Mediterranean fly-
way, clusters lasted from December 2005 to March
2006. Finally, clusters appeared in the East Atlantic
and East Africa West Asian flyways in March and
April 2006, respectively.
Dynamics of space-time H5N1 clusters and season-
al bird migration
Six H5N1 cluster patterns were found to be asso-
ciated with the seasonal migration of waterbirds
(Fig. 6). In February 2004, a northbound spread of
disease clusters was identified from Indonesia, via
Thailand and Cambodia, to Japan. This disease pat-
tern coincided with the wild bird spring migration
northwards via the East Asia Australian flyway (Fig.
6a). During the autumn migration (August to
November in 2004), the birds migrated southwards
via the East Asia Australian flyway, which coincid-
ed with the disease spreading into Southeast Asia
(Fig. 6b), as space-time clusters shifted from
Thailand (August), via Malaysia (September), to
south Indonesia (December). In the autumn of 2005
(Fig. 6c), a similar pattern was detected, in Thailand
(September) and Indonesia (October), the disease
clusters again following a north-south direction,
overlapping with the birds’ migration route via the
East Asia Australian flyway.
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The disease clusters detected in western Russia
(October 2005), the Black Sea region (December
2005) and Nigeria (January 2006), occurred in a
northeast to southwest direction and coincided with
peak migratory movements via the Black Sea
Mediterranean flyway during autumn (Fig. 6d).
During spring 2006 (Fig. 6e), space-time clusters
were detected from Italy, Slovenia and neighbouring
countries (February), to Denmark (March), as well
as from Nigeria (February) to Denmark (March),
following south-north directions. The spatio-tempo-
ral dynamics of these disease clusters correspond
with the timing and direction of bird migration
along both the Black Sea Mediterranean flyway and
the East Atlantic flyway. In April 2006, disease clus-
ters were first observed in Sudan, and then in
Pakistan (Fig. 6f), which coincide with the direction
and timing of birds migrating over the East Africa
West Asian flyway.
Discussion
The H5N1 virus outbreaks can be divided into
three global epidemic phases. By displaying the
monthly dynamics of the space-time clusters of the
disease and the matching migratory flyways of wild
birds, a quantitative description is presented of
H5N1 transmission at a global scale, and the possi-
ble relationship between migratory birds and the
spread of the disease is revealed. The H5N1 out-
breaks were mainly concentrated in winter and early
spring (from October to March), suggesting a sea-
sonally higher risk of infection.
The possibility of long-distance virus spread by
migratory birds
A chronology of H5N1 infections developed from
the East Asia Atlantic flyway to the Central Asian
flyway, the Black Sea Mediterranean flyway, the
East Atlantic flyway and finally the East Africa West
Asian flyway, suggesting that the H5N1 virus may
be transmitted by wild birds via the different fly-
ways. Possible reasons are that migratory birds may
become infected when sharing breeding grounds in
Siberia, as well as overlapping flyways creating
opportunities for birds to come into contact with
each other.
The correlation between disease cluster patterns
and seasonal wild bird migration suggests that wild
birds may spread the virus over long distances.
Some of our results are consistent with a previous
report (Gilbert et al., 2006b), indicating that
Anatidae may spread the virus from Russia and
Kazakhstan to the Black Sea region during the
autumn migration. We found that the virus also
appeared in Nigeria after the Black Sea region had
been infected. The pandemic in Nigeria occurred in
January 2006, after the migratory season, but the
virus may have already been present in the popula-
tion of birds overwintering in Nigeria, with out-
breaks not occurring until some time after the
arrival of the migratory birds. A similar delay was
observed in Romania, where the virus was first
detected in October 2005, but the first high risk
cluster was not detected till December 2005.
Ducatez et al. (2006) found that the three H5N1
lineages found at two farms in Nigeria were inde-
pendently introduced through routes coinciding
with the migratory bird flyway. Our findings also
support a previous study which suggest that the
African sublineages emerged outside of Africa but
Fig. 5. Space-time H5N1 clusters along and across the flyways.
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followed the East African West Asian and Black Sea
Mediterranean flyways, as at least two of the sub-
lineages isolated in western Africa also circulated in
Germany during 2006 (Ducatez et al., 2007).
However, human mobility can not be excluded com-
pletely, as Nigeria imports large numbers of poultry,
without rigorous bio-security safeguards, from dif-
ferent countries in the world (Ducatez et al., 2006).
The long-distance disease spread does coincide with
the seasonal pattern of bird migration over the
Black Sea Mediterranean flyway.
All this evidence supports the hypothesis, that the
spread of the H5N1 virus is associated with migra-
tory movements of birds via well-known flyways.
Though our study attempts to seek the role of wild
birds in spreading H5N1 virus by correlative stud-
ies, this of course does not constitute “proof”. In
other words, human mobility cannot be ruled out as
a vector in the observed patterns of virus transmis-
sion. Besides, some spatio-temporal patterns of the
disease clusters, such as in Egypt (February 2006)
and Sudan (March 2006), do not follow the domi-
nant flyway direction from South to North trend
expected for that time of the year, which may be
caused by poultry transportation with H5N1 virus.
Latitudinal and unusual bird movements may facil-
itate the H5N1 virus spread as well. Gilbert et al.
(2006b) suggested that the western European pan-
demic was caused by unusual waterfowl movements,
due to unseasonably cold weather in the Black Sea
area, where the virus was already established.
However, detailed and localized bird movement pat-
terns are required to further test this hypothesis,
which is beyond the scope of the current study.
The possibility of short-distance virus spread by
migratory birds
Migratory birds could be involved in short-dis-
tance virus spreading, especially where disease clus-
ters were detected in overwintering areas. A large
number of disease clusters was detected during win-
ter and spring in important staging and overwinter-
ing regions for migratory waterbirds (http://ram-
sar.wetlands.org/Default.aspx), such as Xuan Thuy
Natural Wetland Reserve in Vietnam, Chany Lakes
in Russia, Kizilirmak Delta in Turkey, Aquatic-cliff
complex of Karadag in Ukraine, South Funen
Archipelago in Denmark, Vendicari in Italy and
Maldunba Lake in Nigeria. By sharing staging and
overwintering sites, migratory waterbirds come into
contact with other flocks of birds, as well as with
free-ranging poultry (Gilbert et al., 2006a; Onozuka
and Hagihara, 2008), facilitating the spread of dis-
ease. In addition, the outbreaks in western Europe
and central Asia (Fig. 2), showed few or no infec-
tions in poultry, suggesting that wild birds have to
play a role in the virus transmission.
Infected migratory birds may facilitate the virus
spread by contaminating overwintering sites, as the
virus may survive without a host for extended peri-
ods, especially at low temperatures. Stallknecht et
al. (1990) determined that water with an initial con-
centration of 1 x 106 TCID50 (50% tissue culture
infective dose) could remain infectious for up to 207
days at 17°C or up to 102 days at 28°C. As the
H5N1 virus remains virulent in bird faeces for at
least 35 days at 4°C and 6 days at 37°C (OIE,
2008), the frequent reoccurrences of disease clusters
in Thailand (June to December 2004, July to
September 2005), west Russia (July, August and
October 2005), Vietnam (October to December
2005) and the Black Sea region (May and June
2006), suggest that local outbreaks may be caused
by viruses surviving in contaminated areas.
Both local and regional clusters were assumed to
be associated with epidemic risks in this study.
However, we cannot exclude the possibility of some
clusters, especially local ones, having no relation-
ship with bird migration. Distinguishing epidemic
risk clusters from endemic risk clusters requires
extra data, such as distribution pattern of genetic
lineage. This study explored the maximally possible
role of wild bird in spreading H5N1 virus at either
regional or local scales. We recommend confirming
these findings by using genetic lineage distribution
patterns to exclude endemic risks in future studies.
In conclusion, the spread of the H5N1 virus, as
Y. Si et al. - Geospatial Health 4(1), 2009, pp. 65-7876
quantified by the space-time clusters, was found to
be associated with the timing, location and direction
of continental bird migration, suggesting that wild
birds spread H5N1 over long distances. Disease
clusters were also detected at sites that are known
overwintering areas, and at times when these areas
were frequented by migratory birds, suggesting that
wild birds are involved in short distance H5N1
spread as well.
Acknowledgements
This research is sponsored by the China Scholarship
Council (CSC) and the International Institute for Geo-
Information Science and Earth Observation (ITC).
References
Alexander DJ, 2000. A review of avian infuenza in different
bird species. Vet Microbiol 74, 3-13.
Alexander DJ, 2007. Summary of avian influenza activity in
Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australasia, 2002–2006. Avian
Dis 51, 161-166.
Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Committee,
2001. Asia-Pacific migratory waterbird conservation strate-
gy: 2001-2005. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Boere GC, Stroud DA, 2006. The flyway concept: what it is
and what it isn’t. Waterbirds around the world. GC Boere,
CA Galbraith, DA Stroud (Eds). Edinburgh, UK, pp. 40-47.
Brown JD, Stallknecht DE, Swayne DE, 2008. Experimental
infection of swans and geese with highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus (H5N1) of Asian lineage. Emerg Infect Dis
14, 136-142.
Buranathai C, Amonsin A, Chaisigh A, Theamboonlers A,
Pariyothorn N, PoovorawanC Y, 2007. Surveillance activi-
ties and molecular analysis of H5N1 highly pathogenic
avian influenza viruses from Thailand, 2004–2005. Avian
Dis 51, 194-200.
Cardona CJ, Zheng X, Sandrock CE, Davis CE, 2009. Avian
influenza in birds and mammals. Comp Immunol Microbiol
Fig. 6. Dynamics of significant space-time H5N1 clusters overlaid with correlated flyways during migratory seasons. The size
of the circle is determined by the value of the relative risk (ratio of observed to expected outbreaks). Black circles indicate local
clusters (radius δ 10 km) and red circles indicate regional clusters (radius >10 km). Black arrows show the movement direc-
tion of disease clusters.
Y. Si et al. - Geospatial Health 4(1), 2009, pp. 65-78 77
Infect Dis 32, 255-273.
CDC, 2008. Principles of epidemiology: an introduction to
applied epidemiology and biostatistics, Atlanta, USA, 424
pp.
Chen H, Deng G, Li Z, Tian G, Li Y, Jiao P, Zhang L, Liu Z,
Webster RG, Yu K, 2004. The evolution of H5N1 influen-
za viruses in ducks in southern China. Proc Natl Acad Sci
USA 101, 10452-10457.
Chen H, Li Y, Li Z, Shi J, Shinya K, Deng G, Qi Q, Tian G,
Fan S, Zhao H, Sun Y, Kawaoka Y, 2006. Properties and
dissemination of H5N1 viruses isolated during an influenza
outbreak in migratory waterfowl in Western China. J Virol
80, 5976-5983.
Chen H, Smith GJD, Zhang SY, Qin K, Wang J, Li KS,
Webster RG, Peiris JSM, Guan Y, 2005. H5N1 virus out-
break in migratory waterfowl: a worrying development
could help to spread this dangerous virus beyond its strong-
hold in southeast Asia. Nature 436, 191-192.
Cooper DL, Smith GE, Regan M, Large S, Groenewegen PP,
2008. Tracking the spatial diffusion of influenza and
norovirus using telehealth data: a spatiotemporal analysis
of syndromic data. BMC Med 6.
Diggle P, 2003. Statistical analysis of spatial point patterns.
Hodder Arnold, London, UK.
Ducatez MF, Olinger CM, Owoade AA, Landtsheer SD,
Ammerlaan W, Niesters HGM, Osterhaus ADME, Fouchier
RAM, Muller CP, 2006. Multiple introductions of H5N1 in
Nigeria. Nature 442, 37.
Ducatez MF, Olinger CM, Owoade AA, Tarnagda Z, Tahita
MC, Sow A, Landtsheer SD, Ammerlaan W, Ouedraogo JB,
Osterhaus ADME, Fouchier RAM, Mulle CP, 2007.
Molecular and antigenic evolution and geographical spread
of H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses in west-
ern Africa. J Gen Virol 88, 2297-2306.
Dwass M, 1957. Modified randomization tests for nonpara-
metric hypotheses. Ann Math Stat 28, 181-187.
Feare CJ, Yasué M, 2006. Asymptomatic infection with high-
ly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 in wild birds: how
sound is the evidence? Vet J 3.
Gilbert M, Chaitaweesub P, Parakamawongsa T,
Premashthira S, Tiensin T, Kalpravidh W, Wagner H,
Slingenbergh J, 2006a. Free-grazing ducks and highly path-
ogenic avian influenza, Thailand. Emerg Infect Dis 12, 227-
234.
Gilbert M, Xiao X, Domenech J, Lubroth J, Martin V,
Slingenbergh J, 2006b. Anatidae migration in the Western
Palearctic and spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza
H5N1 Virus. Emerg Infect Dis 12, 1650-1656.
Gilbert M, Xiao X, Pfeiffer DU, Epprecht M, Boles S,
Czarnecki C, Chaitaweesub P, Kalpravidh W, Minh PQ,
Otte MJ, Martin V, Slingenbergh J, 2008. Mapping H5N1
highly pathogenic avian influenza risk in Southeast Asia.
Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 105, 4769-4774.
Keawcharoen J, van Riel D, Amerongen G, Bestebroer T,
Beyer WE, van Lavieren R, Osterhaus ADME, Fouchier
RAM, Kuiken T, 2008. Wild ducks as long-distance vectors
of highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1). Emerg
Infect Dis 14, 600-607.
Kilpatrick AM, Chmura AA, Gibbons DW, Fleischer RC,
Marra PP, Daszak P, 2006. Predicting the global spread of
H5N1 avian influenza. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103,
19368-19373.
Kulldorff M, 2006. SaTScan User Guide. StatScan, Boston,
USA, 102 pp.
Kulldorff M, Heffernan R, Hartman J, Assuncao R,
Mostashari F, 2005. A space-time permutation Scan
Statistic for disease outbreak detection. PLoS Med 2, 216-
224.
Lee C-W, Suarez TMT, Sung H-W, Kwon Y-K, Lee Y-J, Choi
J-G, Joh S-J, Kim M-C, Lee E-K, Park J-M, Lu X, Katz JM,
Spackman E, Swayne DE, Kim HJ, 2005. Characterization
of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza A viruses iso-
lated from South Korea. J Virol 79, 3692-3702.
Lee Y-J, Choi Y-K, Kim Y-J, Song M-S, Jeong O-M, Lee E-K,
Jeon W-J, Jeong W, Joh S-J, Choi K-s, Her M, Kim M-C,
Kim A, Kim M-J, Lee Eh, Oh T-G, Moon H-J, Yoo D-W,
Kim J-H, Sung M-H, Poo H, Kwon J-H, Kim C-J, 2008.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) in domes-
tic poultry and relationship with migratory birds, South
Korea. Emerg Infect Dis 14, 487-490.
Li KS, Guan Y, Wang J, Smith GJD, Xu KM, Duan L,
Rahardjo AP, Puthavathana P, Buranathai C, Nguyen TD,
Estoepangestie ATS, Chaisingh A, Auewarakul P, Long HT,
Hanh NTH, Webby RJ, Poon LLM, Chen H, Shortridge KF,
Yuen KY, Webster RG, Peiris JSM, 2004. Genesis of a high-
ly pathogenic and potentially pandemic H5N1 influenza
virus in eastern Asia. Nature 430, 209-213.
Liu J, Xiao H, Lei F, Zhu Q, Qin K, Zhang X-w, Zhang X-l,
Y. Si et al. - Geospatial Health 4(1), 2009, pp. 65-7878
Zhao D, Wang G, Feng Y, Ma J, Liu W, Wang J, Gao GF,
2005. Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus infection in
migratory birds. Science 309, 1206.
Normile D, 2006. Evidence points to migratory birds in
H5N1 spread. Science 311, 1225.
Norstrom M, Pfeiffer D, Jarp J, 2000. A space-time cluster
investigation of an outbreak of acute respiratory disease in
Norwegian cattle herds. Prev Vet Med 47, 107-119.
OIE, 2005. Avian Influenza. Terrestrial Animal Health Code.
OIE, Paris, France.
OIE, 2008. Disease Card. Avian Inluenza. OIE, Paris, France.
Olsen B, Munster VJ, Wallensten A, Waldenstro J, Osterhaus
ADME, Fouchier RAM, 2006. Global patterns of influenza
A virus in wild birds. Science 312, 384-388.
Onozuka D, Hagihara A, 2008. Spatial and temporal dynam-
ics of influenza outbreaks. Epidemiology 19, 824-828.
Oyana TJ, Dai D, Scott KE, 2006. Spatio-temporal distribu-
tions of reported cases of the avian influenza H5N1 (bird flu)
in Southern China in early 2004. Avian Dis 50, 508-515.
Pearl DL, Louie M, Chui L, Dore K, Grimsrud KM, Leedell
D, Martin SW, Michel P, Svenson LW, Mcewen SA, 2006.
The use of outbreak information in the interpretation of
clustering of reported cases of Escherichia coli O157 in
space and time in Alberta, Canada, 2000-2002. Epidemiol
Infect 134, 699-711.
Pei Y, Swinton J, Ojkic D, Sharif S, 2009. Genetic character-
ization of two low pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1
isolates from Ontario, Canada. Virus Genes 38, 149-154.
Pfeiffer DU, Minh PQ, Martin V, Epprecht M, Otte MJ,
2007. An analysis of the spatial and temporal patterns of
highly pathogenic avian influenza occurrence in Vietnam
using national surveillance data. Vet J 174, 302-309.
Pittman M, Laddomada A, 2008. Legislation for the control
of avian influenza in the European Union. Zoonoses Public
Health 55, 29-36.
Sauders BD, Fortes ED, Morse DL, Dumas N, Kiehlbauch JA,
Schukken Y, Hibbs JR, Wiedmann M, 2003. Molecular
subtyping to detect human listeriosis clusters. Emerg Infect
Dis 9, 672-680.
Scott DA, Rose PM, 1996. Atlas of Anatidae populations in
Africa and western Eurasia. Wetland International,
Wageningen, The Netherlands, 336 pp.
Stallknecht DE, Shane SM, Kearney MT, ZwankB PJ, 1990.
Persistence of avian influenza viruses in water. Avian Dis
34, 406-411.
Stroud DA, Davidson NC, West R, Scott DA, Hanstra L,
Thorup O, Ganter B, Delany S, 2004. Status of migratory
wader populations in Africa and Western Eurasia in the
1990s. International Wader Studies 15, 1-259.
Suarez DL, 2000. Evolution of avian influenza viruses. Vet
Microbiol 74, 15-17.
Subbarao K, Katz J, 2000. Avian influenza viruses infecting
humans. Cell Mol Life Sci 57, 1770-1784.
Swayne DE, Halvorson DA, 2003. Influenza. Diseases of
poultry. YM Saif, HJ Barnes, JR Glisson, AM Fadly, LR
McDougald, DE Swayne (Eds). Iowa State University Press,
Ames, USA, pp. 135-160.
Swayne DE, King DJ, 2003. Avian influenza and Newcastle
disease. J Am Vet Med Assoc 222, 1534-1540.
Tiensin T, Chaitaweesub P, Songserm T, Chaisingh A,
Hoonsuwan W, Buranathai C, Parakamawongsa T,
Premashthira S, Amonsin A, Gilbert M, Nielen M,
Stegeman A, 2005. Highly pathogenic avian influenza
H5N1, Thailand, 2004. Emerg Infect Dis 11, 1664-1672.
Ward MP, Maftei D, Apostu C, Suru A, 2008. Geostatistical
visualisation and spatial statistics for evaluation of the dis-
persion of epidemic highly pathogenic avian influenza sub-
type H5N1. Vet Res 39, 22.
Weber TP, Stilianakis NI, 2007. Ecologic immunology of
avian influenza (H5N1) in migratory birds. Emerg Infect
Dis 13, 1139-1143.
Webster RG, Bean WJ, Gorman OT, Chambers TM,
Kawaoka Y, 1992. Evolution and ecology of influenza A
viruses. Microbiol Rev 56, 152-179.
WHO, 2006. Avian influenza (“bird flu”). WHO, Geneva,
Switzerland.
Xu X, Subbarao K, Cox NJ, Guo Y, 1999. Genetic characteri-
zation of the pathogenic influenza A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96
(H5N1) virus: similarity of its haemagglutinin gene to those
of H5N1 viruses from the 1997 outbreaks in Hong Kong.
Virology 261, 15-19.
Yee KS, Carpenter TE, Cardona CJ, 2009. Epidemiology of
H5N1 avian influenza. Comp Immunol Microbiol Infect
Dis 32, 325-340.
